Political DIsagreement

This book examines and critiques Steve Fuller’s social epistemology on his study of four ways to understand the nature of post-truth: way one’s understanding is an epistemic crisis in which emotion has taken over and facts are irrelevant; way two’s understanding is a legitimation crisis of cognitive authority of science on the legitimation and delegitimation of knowledge claims; way three’s understanding is the Internet and social media have led to the democratization of knowledge; way four’s understanding is the impact of (...) artificial intelligence (AI) on the changing boundaries of the knower. -/- Though Fuller is known for his early social epistemology on how knowledge should be organized, and for his later social epistemology on a post-human future and the impact of AI on the changing boundaries of the knower, his position on the nature of post-truth brings together his early and later social epistemology into a coherent project. This book situates and carefully addresses the critics of Fuller’s work in the context of ongoing crises of authority in science and technology studies, expertise, the university, democracy, and the mass media. (shrink)

Many accounts of political liberalism contend that reasonable citizens ought to refrain from invoking their disputed comprehensive beliefs in public deliberation about constitutional essentials. Critics maintain that this ‘refraining condition’ puts pressure on citizens to entertain skepticism about their own basic beliefs, and that accounts of political liberalism committed to it are resultantly committed to a position – skepticism about conceptions of the good – that is itself subject to reasonable disagreement. Discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have tended to (...) reinforce this critique, which has come to be known as political liberalism’s skeptical problem. This paper responds to the skeptical problem by providing a novel rationale to the refraining condition, which I call the burden of total experience. Such a burden emphasizes that full communication of the basis of individual belief is not always possible, even between epistemic peers. Accepting the burden of total experience allows individuals to recognize the reasonableness of the refraining condition in a way that stops the slide to skepticism, all while avoiding, or so I argue, relying on a problematically controversial explainer for disagreement. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have mainly been of interest to social epistemologists in terms of whether one can be warranted in believing them. In this literature, believing a conspiracy theory is often understood to mean endorsing some conspiratorial explanation of events. I argue that, in some cases, conspiracy belief is better understood as (dis)trusting sources of claims. To demonstrate this, I show that disputes over conspiracy theories possess a distinctive tendency (but not a necessity) to generate deep disagreement arising specifically from divergent (...) attributions of trust in others. I explain this tendency in terms of agents’ desires to maintain consistency among their beliefs and avoid inquiring into their attributions of trust. Individuals who believe conspiracy theories often do not remain committed to the same conspiratorial explanations but do nonetheless remain firmly committed to attitudes of trust and distrust. By arguing that conspiracy belief often manifests as (dis)trust, I challenge a common assumption in the philosophy of conspiracy theories that conspiracy belief, understood as taking conspiracy explanations to be true, can always serve as an appropriate basis for asking when believing conspiracy theories is warranted. (shrink)

This study analyzes a specific cognitive bias and argumentative fallacy for which the author introduces the original term polarization error. It is a faulty abductive inference in which an agent interprets a disagreement at the non-axiological level (instrumental or definitional) as a fundamental disagreement at the axiological level. The aim of this paper is not to deny the existence of genuine value conflicts, but to demonstrate how pseudo-value disputes imperceptibly intermingle with legitimate conflicts in a polarized society. The author argues (...) that the essence of this error lies in the projection of one's own knowledge onto the opponent and the attribution of bad faith, which leads to a form of epistemic misrecognition (in the sense of A. Honneth). Failure to recognize this type of dispute transforms political agonism into destructive antagonism and sets in motion the polarization spiral. The study illustrates this mechanism through examples from contemporary public discourse and proposes a corrective through the Principle of Charity as a necessary condition for functional agonism. (shrink)

When evidence-based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence-based policymaking, which (...) we call transparency of reasoning. Such transparency is critical to the success of the evidence-based policy movement, as without it, we will be unable to tell whether in any instance a policy was in fact based on evidence. (shrink)

Parties to collective decisions in social and political life can have both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons to accept compromise agreements. According to one view, parties sometimes have non-instrumental epistemic reason for moral compromise. The strongest argument for this view asserts that the fact of disagreement between epistemic peers gives them reason to be more tentative about the beliefs in dispute. I argue that this epistemic peerhood argument fails. First, epistemic peerhood is unlikely to imply that parties should be more tentative (...) in their moral beliefs in conditions where the burdens of judgment make reasonable moral disagreement unsurprising. Second, even if epistemic peerhood does sometimes have this implication, this fact would generate reasons for correction rather than reasons for compromise. Reasons for compromise arise from the conflictual nature of disagreement in collective decision making, not from any evidentiary significance that disagreement may or may not have. (shrink)

I argue that in many cases, there are good reasons to engage with people who hold fringe beliefs such as debunked conspiracy theories. I (1) discuss reasons for engaging with fringe beliefs; (2) discuss the conditions that need to be met for engagement to be worthwhile; (3) consider the question of how to engage with such beliefs, and defend what Jeremy Fantl has called “closed-minded engagement” and (4) address worries that such closed-minded engagement involves problematic deception or manipulation. Thinking about (...) how we engage with irrational emotions offers a way of responding to these concerns. Reflection on engagement with fringe beliefs has wider implications for two distinct philosophical discussions. First, it can help illuminate the nature of beliefs, lending support to the view that not all states which are deeply resistant to evidence thereby fail to be beliefs. Second, an implication of the view I put forth is that it need not constitute a lack of respect to adopt what Peter Strawson called “the objective stance” in relationships. (shrink)

This chapter reflects on some of the major themes of this volume, as it takes up the question: is truth a value in political discourse? As a preliminary step, we evaluate a view of political discourse that answers this question negatively: the identity-expression view. According to this view, political claims function to express commitments central to an individual’s political self-conceptions, rather than to state truths in the political domain. While we often assess political claims as true or false, the identity-expression (...) view maintains that such assessments are nothing more than our way of affirming or rejecting such claims—assessments of truth in politics are themselves only ways of expressing the political identity of the assessor. We explore the implications of the identity-expression view for the analysis of political disagreement and argue that, while some political disagreements may be best modeled this way, it is not clear that all of them are: at least sometimes, political disagreements are clearly responsive to the exchange of truth-apt reasons. Indeed, the structure of political disagreements (and some cases of polarization) suggest that truth continues to play an important aspirational role in many political exchanges. This leads us to embrace a pluralist picture of the function of political discourse: political discourse performs multiple functions, including reaching political decisions based on a public exchange of truth-apt reasons, and motivating political action via expressions of identity-forming political commitments. We also draw some broader implications of this pluralist position about the function of political discourse for theories of truth. This includes deflationist approaches to truth making a good fit for expressive uses of political claims in disagreement in attitude, whereas substantive theories of truth appear better suited to explain factual political disagreements. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan resultados de un proyecto de investigación que se propuso analizar trayectorias de clase de familias del Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires pertenecientes a sectores medios. Entre las estrategias cualitativas, se han realizado 18 entrevistas semiestructuradas a mujeres y varones nacidos en la década de 1950 y en la década de 1970, con el fin de comparar los acontecimientos biográficos y familiares de estas dos cohortes, según la posición de clase a través del tiempo. El análisis (...) de las entrevistas sugiere que existen representaciones compartidas entre distintos perfiles de personas pertenecientes a sectores medios respecto de las oportunidades y especialmente de las limitaciones que ha presentado Argentina en el largo plazo para el bienestar material y la mejora en las condiciones de vida. -/- Representations about living conditions in Argentina from metropolitan middle class Abstract. This article presents results of a research project that aimed to analyze class trajectories of families in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires belonging to middle classes. Among the qualitative strategies, 18 semi-structured interviews have been carried out with women and men born in the 1950s and the 1970s, in order to compare the biographical and family events of these two cohorts, according to class position through time. The analysis of the interviews suggests that there are shared representations among different profiles of people belonging to middle sectors regarding the opportunities and especially about limitations that Argentina has presented in the long term for material well-being and improvement in living conditions. Keywords: living conditions; Argentina; representations; social class; generation. (shrink)

Science education is generally perceived as a key facilitator in cultivating a scientifically literate society. In the last decade, however, this conventional wisdom has been challenged by evidence that greater scientific literacy and critical thinking skills may in fact inadvertently aggravate polarization on scientific matters in the public sphere. Supporting an alternative “scientific update hypothesis,” in a series of studies (total N = 2087), we show that increased science’s epistemology literacy might have consequential population-level effects on the public’s alignment with (...) scientific results. In one exploratory study and a pre-registered national online survey, we first show that understanding scientific epistemology predicts refusal of pseudoscientific beliefs and higher scores in a methodology of science test. We also find and replicate a propensity for epistemologically literate citizens to endorse the norm of belief updating and the communicated scientific consensus following both ideologically congruent and incongruent scientific results. Notably, after 2 months of first being presented with scientific results on politically controversial issues, a one standard deviation higher score in epistemological literacy is associated with a 14% increase in the odds of individuals switching their beliefs to align with the scientifically communicated consensus. We close by discussing how, on the face of ideological incongruity, a general understanding of scientific epistemology might foster the acceptance of scientific results, and we underscore the need for a more nuanced appreciation of how education, public comprehension of scientific knowledge, and the dynamics of polarization intersect in the public sphere. (shrink)

Recently, epistemologists have been much concerned with the question of whether or not we have to revise our beliefs if there are people whose epistemic position is as good as ours and who disagree with us. The results of such considerations, whatever they are, are sometimes said to be restricted to domains in which, unlike in politics or law, the relevant agents are not under any pressure to act in accordance with their beliefs, have no deeply held ideological beliefs, or (...) have no beliefs that stem from their particular aims or desires. In response to this, and with regard to the paradigmatic cases of politics and law, this article argues that there are no genuine political or legal disagreements: what we call a political or legal disagreement is either no disagreement at all but a mere clash of interest, or it is a an empirical, moral, or practical disagreement that is not genuinely political or legal. To the latter, epistemological insights apply; to the former, they do not. (shrink)

The ongoing digital transformation of almost all areas of human action and agency calls for a readjustment of the norms that regulate these practices. For example, the digitisation of communicative practices poses new challenges to their functioning. This paper explains some of these challenges and argues that they cannot be met by a normative framework that focuses mainly on defensive (free speech and property) rights. In the context of mediated digital communication, the application of such a framework may even have (...) paradoxical consequences. Accordingly, this paper argues for a broader system of communicative rights, understood as rights to meaningful participation in well-functioning communicative practices. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of ‘fast science’ should respond, and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of ‘higher-order evidence’ (HOE) and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant (...) HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19. (shrink)

During emerging public health crises, both policymakers and members of the public are looking to scientific experts to provide guidance. Even in cases where there are significant uncertainties, there is pressure for experts to “speak with one voice” to avoid confusion, allow officials to make evidence-based decisions rapidly, and encourage public support for such decisions. This can lead experts to engage in masking of information about the state of the science or regarding assumptions involved in policy recommendations. Although experts might (...) have good reasons for masking disagreements, uncertainties, or assumptions when offering policy advice, we argue that this strategy can result in epistemic harms. Using the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that public health authorities masked two types of information necessary for laypersons to evaluate public health recommendations: (1) experts’ disagreements about the scientific evidence and (2) the role of values in making inferences from the science to policy positions. We contend that this resulted in epistemic harms against laypeople that provide a pro tanto case against masking information. We further argue that when the science is in flux and policies need to be implemented despite significant uncertainties, there is an all-things-considered case against masking the types of information discussed. (shrink)

.Deep disagreements are those involving a disagreement about (relatively) fundamental epistemic principles. This paper considers the bearing of testimonial injustice, in Miranda Fricker’s sense, on the depth of disagreements, and what this can teach us about the nature and significance of deep disagreements. I start by re-evaluating T. J. Lagewaard’s recent argument that disagreements about the nature, scope, and impact of oppression will often be deepened by testimonial injustice, since the people best placed to offer relevant testimony will be subject (...) to testimonial injustice, pushing the disagreement into one about the bearing of certain epistemic sources on the original debate. I take issue with this last step, but I build on the argument to bring attention to unappreciated and worrying ways in which prejudices can make a disagreement deep in ways that can be hidden from one or more of the participants and from observers. Finally, I revisit some of the ways that deep disagreement has been thought to be problematic for the proper functioning of a democracy, and I examine whether the kinds of hidden deep disagreements I argue for in the paper make these problems any worse, concluding that they likely do. (shrink)

(OPEN ACCESS) This paper establishes moral duties for intermediaries of political advertising in election campaigns. First, I argue for a collective duty to maintain the democratic quality of elections which entails a duty to contain some forms of political polarization. Second, I show that the focus of campaign ethics on candidates, parties and voters—ignoring the mediators of campaigns—yields mistaken conclusions about how the burdens of the latter collective duty should be distributed. Third, I show why it is fair to require (...) intermediaries to contribute to fulfilling this duty: they have an ultimate filtering position in the campaign communication process and typically benefit from political advertising and polarization. Finally, I argue that a transparency-based ethics of campaign advertising cannot properly accommodate a concern with objectionable polarization. By contrast, I outline the polarization-containing implications of my account, including a prohibition on online targeted advertising, and intermediaries’ duties to block hateful political advertising. (shrink)

A slew of newspaper articles were published in the 2010s with titles like: “The facts on why facts alone can’t fight false beliefs” and “Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds — New discoveries about the human mind show the limitations of reason”. They promoted a common idea: if a person doesn’t conform to the scientific majority, it’s because she forms beliefs on scientific questions in order to achieve social goals (to fit in with people of her kind, to make her (...) social life more comfortable) instead of engaging in an earnest hunt for the truth. Rational persuasion doesn’t work with her. To change her mind, science communicators must become more paternalist. They must adopt methods of persuasion that bypass her awareness—the arts of the marketeer, the ad man. Drawing upon ideas from my recent paper, this piece aims to convince you not to take these articles so seriously. Te piece is a shortened and simplified presentation of ideas from the paper "Science Communication, Cultural Cognition, and the Pull of Epistemic Paternalism.". (shrink)

Political epistemology is the intersection of political philosophy and epistemology. This paper develops a political 'hinge' epistemology. Political hinge epistemology draws on the idea that all belief systems have fundamental presuppositions which play a role in the determination of reasons for belief and other attitudes. It uses this core idea to understand and tackle political epistemological challenges, like political disagreement, polarization, political testimony, political belief, ideology, and biases, among other possibilities. I respond to two challenges facing the development of a (...) political hinge epistemology. The first is about nature and demarcation of political hinges, while the second is about rational deliberation over political hinges. I then use political hinge epistemology to analyze ideology, dealing with the challenge of how an agent's ideology 'masks' or distorts their understanding of social reality, along with the challenge of how ideology critique can change the beliefs of agents who adhere to dominant ideologies, if agents only have their own or the competing ideology to rely on (see Haslanger 2017). I then explore how political hinge epistemology might be extended to further our understanding of political belief polarization. (shrink)

In contemporary political discussions, it is depressingly common to see people criticized for expressing impure beliefs. Moreover, those who sometimes defect from their tribe are criticized for failing to be firmly enough on the side of the angels. We consider explanations for this behavior, including its relationship to moral grandstanding. We will also argue, on both moral and epistemic grounds, in favor of a norm against “blocking the exits.” We should not use social pressure to discourage people from publicly changing (...) their minds. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

In an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. -/- Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues (...) that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the practice of civil disagreement has robust epistemic benefits and that these benefits enable meaningful forms of reconciliation—across worldview lines and amid the challenging information environment of our age. I then engage two broad groups of objections: either that civil disagreement opposes, rather than promotes, clarity, or else that it does little to help it. If successful, my account gives us reason to include civil disagreement among what Mill calls “the real morality of public (...) discussion,” a fact that should stir us to take more seriously the decline of civility in contemporary life. (shrink)

Sometimes citizens disagree about political matters, but a decision must be made. We have two theoretical frameworks for resolving political disagreement. The first is the framework of social choice. In it, our goal is to treat parties to the dispute fairly, and there is no sense in which some are right and the others wrong. The second framework is that of collective decision-making. Here, we do believe that preferences are truth apt, and our moral consideration is owed not to those (...) who disagree but to the community that stands to benefit or suffer from the decision. In this chapter, I describe and explore these two frameworks. I conclude two things. First, analysis of real-world disagreement suggests that collective decision-making is the right way to model politics. In most, possibly even all, political disagreement, all parties believe (if implicitly) that there is an objective standard of correctness. Second, this matter is connected to the concept of pluralism. If pluralism is true, then collective decision-making cannot be applied to some political disagreements. More surprisingly, pluralism may rule out the applicability of social choice theory as well. (shrink)

Policymakers who seek to make scientifically informed decisions are constantly confronted by scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement. This thesis asks: how can policymakers rationally respond to expert disagreement and scientific uncertainty? This is a work of non-ideal theory, which applies formal philosophical tools developed by ideal theorists to more realistic cases of policymaking under scientific uncertainty. I start with Bayesian approaches to expert testimony and the problem of expert disagreement, arguing that two popular approaches— supra-Bayesianism and the standard model of (...) expert deference—are insufficient. I develop a novel model of expert deference and show how it can deal with many of these problems raised for them. I then turn to opinion pooling, a popular method for dealing with disagreement. I show that various theoretical motivations for pooling functions are irrelevant to realistic policymaking cases. This leads to a cautious recommendation of linear pooling. However, I then show that any pooling method relies on value judgements, that are hidden in the selection of the scoring rule. My focus then narrows to a more specific case of scientific uncertainty: multiple models of the same system. I introduce a particular case study involving hurricane models developed to support insurance decision-making. I recapitulate my analysis of opinion pooling in the context of model ensembles, confirming that my hesitations apply. This motivates a shift of perspective, to viewing the problem as a decision theoretic one. I rework a recently developed ambiguity theory, called the confidence approach, to take input from model ensembles. I show how it facilitates the resolution of the policymaker’s problem in a way that avoids the issues encountered in previous chapters. This concludes my main study of the problem of expert disagreement. In the final chapter, I turn to methodological reflection. I argue that philosophers who employ the mathematical methods of the prior chapters are modelling. Employing results from the philosophy of scientific models, I develop the theory of normative modelling. I argue that it has important methodological conclusions for the practice of formal epistemology, ruling out popular moves such as searching for counterexamples. (shrink)

This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and (...) if so, what ‎kind of ‎consensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference ‎that a ‎theory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking ‎into ‎consideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of ‎the ‎consensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of ‎consensus ‎formation.‎. (shrink)

When you learn that you disagree with an epistemic peer, what should you believe about the proposition you disagree about? The epistemology of peer disagreement has made considerable progress in answering this question. But to this point, we have largely neglected a significant resource which can help us to determine how peers who disagree can rationally respond to their disagreement. Closely examining actual disagreements in scientific and nonscientific contexts can help us to understand why peers find themselves in disagreement. And (...) knowing why you disagree with your peer can help you to understand how you can rationally respond to your disagreement. Examining specific scientific and nonscientific disagreements shows us that some peers disagree because they disagree about what evidence is relevant to the proposition they disagree about. Dual disagreements about propositions and evidence can be found in numerous areas of disagreement, including ethical, political, philosophical, and scientific arenas. When you find yourself in these dual disagreements, you can rationally believe that your belief is rational and that your peer’s belief, though it diverges from yours, is also rational. But some philosophers have suggested that this situation in which you and your peer have rational beliefs and recognize each other as holding rational beliefs is impossible. A primary motivation for thinking that at least one of you must be believing irrationally is the thesis of Uniqueness about rationality, which states that at most one doxastic attitude can be rationally held given a body of evidence. However, when you consider the epistemic context of your actual disagreements with your peer carefully, you need not think that at least one of you is believing irrationally, even if Uniqueness is true. In response to your disagreement with a peer who disagrees with you both about what evidence is relevant to the proposition you disagree about and the proposition itself, you can even rationally hold a belief which splits the connection between your evidence and your evidence about your evidence. When we consider their epistemic contexts in full relief, peers in disagreement can simultaneously be believing rationally, even if only one of them is right. -/- . (shrink)

This concluding chapter revisits the main topics of the book and emphasizes the need to reframe the problem of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). It contends that limiting attention to the role that problematic dissent plays in undermining support for particular policies and actions is both misguided and dangerous. It calls for a reframing of the problem in ways that are likely to be more fruitful in trying to address the problems that can stem from NID, such as developing scientific and (...) institutional practices that promote warranted public trust in science and encouraging better ways to engage in discussions with all relevant parties about the values at stake in various policy decisions. (shrink)

Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant (...) role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals. (shrink)

This chapters evaluates whether inductive risks judgments can serve as a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Dissent that calls for rejecting certain consensus views related to public policy can be risky. When consensus views are mistakenly rejected, it can have serious consequences for public health and well-being. These risks may not be worth taking when the risks disproportionately fall on the public, or when the dissent in question fails to conform to widely shared standards of good science. (...) It concludes that this account also fails to offer a criterion to reliably identify NID. In part this is because of the difficulties presented by the criterion of shared standards in science. Also, the ambiguities present in judgments about inductive risks lead to serious problems in practice. (shrink)

This chapter considers another factor that plays a role in eroding the public’s trust in science: concerns about the negative influence of nonepistemic values in science, particularly in controversial areas of inquiry with important effects on public policy. It shows that the credibility of scientists can be undermined when the public perceives that scientists have a political agenda or will be biased by their own personal or political values. However, to assume that the best way to address this problem is (...) try to eliminate such values from science altogether would be a mistake. Ethical and social values are necessary and important to knowledge production. Consequently, the chapter explores alternative strategies to increase transparency and stakeholder involvement so as to address legitimate concerns about bias and sustain warranted trust in scientific communities. (shrink)

This chapter assesses whether focusing on rules of engagement for fruitful discussions about competing scientific views provides a good strategy for reliably identifying normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). It discusses some of the rules for effective criticism dominant in the philosophy of science literature: shared standards, uptake, and expertise. It shows that although all these criteria appear eminently reasonable as requirements for transformative criticism, what they actually involve is not straightforward. Some of the interpretations of these criteria are likely to identify (...) as inappropriate dissent that is actually epistemically valuable, while other interpretations of these criteria would fail to pinpoint the very cases of dissent that some consider paradigm cases of NID. (shrink)

This chapter offers a brief overview of the importance of epistemic trust and the relevance that scientific institutions and practices have in promoting or undermining warranted public trust. Epistemic trust is crucial for the production of scientific knowledge, the ability of the public to make sense of scientific phenomena, and the development of public policy. Normatively inappropriate dissent is more likely to take hold and erroneously affect people’s beliefs and actions in a context where the trustworthiness of scientists is called (...) into question and where there is an excessive reliance on scientific information when it comes to assessing policy decisions. Thus, finding ways to facilitate and sustain warranted epistemic trust, as well as increasing understanding of the proper role of science in public policy decisions can help mitigate the negative impact of dissenting views. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether the reliable identification of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) would be helpful in addressing many of the adverse epistemic and social impacts that can result from it. It considers a variety of ways in which such identification could be used to minimize the epistemic and social damages that NID can inflict, including prohibiting the dissent in question, targeting it for special scrutiny, placing limits on scientists’ epistemic obligations, guiding public beliefs, emphasizing the existence of a consensus, and (...) discrediting dissenters. It shows that although some of these strategies could be useful, others are unhelpful in limiting the negative impacts of NID, and may even exacerbate them or generate other equally serious problems. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of the ways in which dissent from a scientific consensus is epistemically valuable. It contends that dissent furthers scientific progress in various ways, including correcting false empirical assumptions, providing alternative ways of conceiving phenomena, and challenging value judgments. Dissent can also strengthen the justification for consensus views as such views are more likely to be reliable when they survive critical scrutiny, than if they go unchallenged. Similarly, dissent can foster warranted public trust in science because (...) it can assure the public that scientific inquiry is an open and critical process. The chapter also points out that because dissent has these benefits, it imposes epistemic obligations on scientific communities. (shrink)

This introductory chapter presents the philosophical approach used in this book to deal with the problematic epistemic and social consequences of some scientific dissent. It challenges approaches to this problem that focus on finding criteria to identify what the authors have termed normatively inappropriate dissent (NID), and it calls for a reframing of the problem that highlights some of the epistemic and social conditions actually contributing to making NID more damaging: scientific institutions and practices that undermine warranted public trust in (...) science and a misunderstanding of the role of science in policy making. It also offers an overview of the book and specifically describes each of the chapters. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some social and institutional factors related to the practice of science that cast doubt on the trustworthiness of scientists and thus contribute to undermining the trust that people place in the scientific community and its claims. Specifically, it explores the roles played by the increasing commercialization of science, with its effect on the common good and on conflicts of interests, and by scientific misconduct in eroding public trust. It explains why this occurs and provides evidence to support (...) the claim that trust has, in fact, been undermined as the result of these factors. It also suggests strategies for changing these trust-undermining practices so as to better facilitate and maintain warranted public trust in scientific communities. (shrink)

This chapter explores whether the presence of bad-faith motive is a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Rather than appropriate epistemic motives to help advance scientific knowledge, bad-faith motives involve some other objectionable goal: to confuse the public, stall policies that the dissenters dislike, promote particular ideological views, or safeguard profits. This chapter evaluates various ways to explain why bad-faith motives could result in dissent that fails to promote or that impedes scientific progress and it assesses their plausibility. (...) It concludes that in spite of the intuitive appeal of attending to motivations, they cannot serve as a criterion to reliably identify NID. (shrink)

Current debates about climate change or vaccine safety provide an alarming illustration of the potential impacts of dissent about scientific claims. False beliefs about evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn from it are commonplace, as is corrosive doubt about the existence of widespread scientific consensus. Deployed aggressively and to political ends, ill-founded dissent can intimidate scientists, stymie research, and lead both the public and policymakers to oppose important policies firmly rooted in science. To criticize dissent is, however, a (...) fraught exercise. Skepticism and fearless debate are key to the scientific process, making it both vital and incredibly difficult to characterize and identify dissent that is problematic in its approach and consequences. Indeed, as de Melo-Martín and Intemann show, the criteria commonly proposed as means of identifying inappropriate dissent are flawed, and the strategies generally recommended to tackle such dissent are not only ineffective but could even make the situation worse. The Fight against Doubt proposes that progress on this front can best be achieved by enhancing the trustworthiness of the scientific community and being more realistic about the limits of science when it comes to policymaking. It shows that a richer understanding is needed of the context in which science operates so as to disarm problematic dissent and those who deploy it in the pursuit of their goals. (shrink)

Dworkin's theoretical disagreement argument, developed in Law's Empire, is presented in that work as the motivator for his interpretive account of law. Like Dworkin's earlier arguments critical of legal positivism, the argument from theoretical disagreement has generated a lively exchange with legal positivists. It has motivated three of them to develop innovative positivist positions. In its original guise, the argument from theoretical disagreement is presented as ‘the semantic sting argument’. However, the argument from theoretical disagreement has more than one version. (...) This article briefly discusses two versions and the leading replies to them, then focuses on the most influential version, directed at Hartian positivism. The article surveys the leading positivist rejoinders to the recast version, indicating key Dworkinian replies or assessing the strength of these rejoinders, and concludes with a rejoinder of its own, making a new case that the argument from theoretical disagreement isn't fatal for Hartian legal positivism. (shrink)

Despite having unwelcome effects on interpersonal relationships, disagreements constitute the mainstream of talk in dissertation defense sessions. This paper reports on variations in the design of disagreement turns in 20 Iranian defense sessions in L2 English. Drawing on and modifying Locher’s (2004) classification of disagreement strategies, turns were classified into two main categories of “mitigated” and “unmitigated”. Then, for each category, linguistic and paralinguistic devices, which were used in framing disagreements, were identified. The data features almost an equal number of (...) mitigated and unmitigated disagreements. “But with hedged contradictory remarks”, and “hedges” were the most frequent mitigating strategies, whereas “Direct opposite views” and “but with contradictory remarks” were the most frequent strategies in unmitigated and aggravated disagreements. Finally, the implications of the results for research on face and institutional talk are discussed. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the consequences Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument has for political and social thought. We will show this is particularly important because it challenges the framework where ordinarily is located the discussion of the political and social relevance of Wittgenstein’s thought. Classical discussion has been concerned mainly with the role of communitary agreement, its relativistic or conservative consequences, the room for criticism and disagreement that it leaves, etc. We discern in classical reading a commitment (...) with some epistemological problems (warrants for knowledge) which is not completely overcame, its semantic jargon notwithstanding. Instead, we will argue, the new framework proposed by Kripke, overcome this epistemological problematic, rising new concerns, close to which, in French contemporary thought, has been called “philosophies of the subjection of the subject”. (shrink)

Public deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a ‘meta-agreement’, that is, agreement on the dimension according (...) to which the issues at stake are ‘conceptualized’. We argue here that once all the conditions needed for deliberation to bring about single-peakedness through meta-agreement are unpacked and made explicit, meta-agreement turns out to be a highly demanding condition, and one that is very inhospitable to pluralism. (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement in hard cases is ‘theoretical’ rather than empirical and of central importance to our understanding of law, showing ‘plain fact’ theories such as H. L. A. Hart’s sophisticated legal positivism to be false. The argument from theoretical disagreement targets positivism’s commitment to idea that the criteria a norm must meet to be valid in a given jurisdiction are constituted by a practice of convergent behavior by legal officials. The ATD suggests that in hard cases there (...) is no such pattern of convergent behavior. Positivists are divided over the force of the ATD. Much of this disagreement over the force of the ATD can be understood as disagreement over just what it is that legal officials disagreeing ‘theoretically’ are disagreeing about. Once the scope of empirical and theoretical disagreements are more accurately plotted, we will see that the actual disagreements that occur in hard cases are not ones which threaten a deeper and pervasive pattern of convergent behavior, one which focuses not upon rules specifying criteria of legal validity, but instead upon broad processes for making, interpreting, and applying law. Such an account remains positivist, relying on the social fact that there is such a consensus, but allows for considerable disagreement among legal officials deciding cases within such procedures. (shrink)

Author Jeremy Waldron has thoroughly revised thirteen of his most recent essays in order to offer a comprehensive critique of the idea of the judicial review of legislation. He argues that a belief in rights is not the same as a commitment to a Bill of Rights. This book presents legislation by a representative assembly as a form of law making which is especially apt for a society whose members disagree with one another about fundamental issues of principle.

Western liberal democracies praise themselves for protecting a full range of differences among individuals and groups. The origin of this ongoing process is thought to be Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia. Before the Reformation, it is assumed, “a multiplicity of beliefs was deemed to be dangerous, as well as evil; diversity was, so to speak, the devil’s work, and where it existed it was to be stamped out”. Yet, although flattering to liberalism, the conceit of a modern liberal discovery of liberty (...) of conscience is both conceptually simplistic and historically misleading. The main virtue of this volume is to challenge this tale of Western political history. The essays presented seek to demonstrate that premodern thinkers generated alternative theories of toleration; and to contribute to a philosophical analysis of tolerance. (shrink)